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Short Sale Constraints, Heterogeneous Interpretations, and Asymmetric Price 
Reactions to Earnings Announcements 
 
   
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate the effects of heterogeneous interpretations on price reactions to earnings 
announcements. We find that when investors interpret earnings news homogenously, price 
reactions are stronger to bad news. However, when interpretations of earnings news become 
more heterogeneous, price reactions become stronger to good news. This pattern is more 
pronounced when the short sale constraints are more binding. These findings support the notion 
that, under short sale constraints, price reactions to public information reflect the selective 
registration of more optimistic opinions rather than the average opinion of all investors. This 
study contributes to the accounting literature on the impact of heterogeneous interpretations on 
price reactions to earnings announcements. Our evidence on the significant interplay between the 
price and volume reactions to earnings announcements also adds to the resurgence of interest in 
connecting trading activity to prices.  
 
JEL Classification: G12, G14, M41 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings announcements are among the most important information events by which 
firms disclose information to the market. Accounting research provides extensive evidence that 
earnings announcements convey important information for security valuation. It has also been 
well recognized that deriving the valuation implications of earnings signals is complicated, even 
for sophisticated financial analysts. This complexity leaves ample room for disagreement among 
investors in interpreting earnings signals. The effect of heterogeneous interpretations of earnings 
signals on the price reactions to earnings announcements has not received much attention. The 
lack of attention probably reflects the traditional view that, although disagreement on the public 
information generates trading activity,1
Two recent empirical studies have investigated the effects of short sale constraints on the 
price reactions to earnings announcements. Reed (2007) shows that stocks for which short selling 
is particularly costly have larger price reactions to earnings announcements, especially to bad 
news. He suggests that this evidence confirms Diamond and Verrechia’s (1987) hypothesis that 
short sale constraints reduce the speed with which prices adjust to private (especially negative) 
information. Berkman et al. (2009) document that stocks with a greater difference of opinion 
prior to earnings announcements earn lower returns around these announcements, and this 
pattern is more salient within the subsample of stocks that are more difficult for investors to sell 
 these trades are idiosyncratic and hence offset the effects 
of one another, thus having no consequences for average prices (Hong and Stein 2007).  Building 
on the insights of recent theoretical literature on the pricing effects of short sale constraints, this 
study examines the effect of heterogeneous interpretations of earnings signals on the price 
reactions to earning announcements. 
                                                 
1  For example, Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Bamber et al. (1999), among others, examine the effects of 
heterogeneous interpretations of earnings signals in explaining trading volume around earnings announcements. 
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short. Their evidence suggests that overvaluation exists under short sale constraints, which is 
consistent with Miller’s (1977) overpricing hypothesis, and earnings announcements narrow the 
differences of opinion, hence reducing overvaluation. 
The focus of Reed (2007) and Berkman et al. (2009) is on the effect of earnings 
announcements in enhancing agreement by mitigating the information asymmetry or differences 
of opinion that exist prior to the announcement event. Reed (2007) regards earnings as private 
information until a public announcement is made. Berkman et al. (2009) argue that although 
differences of opinion among investors about stock value may not be completely eliminated after 
earnings announcements, they are reduced. Neither Reed (2007) nor Berkman et al. (2009) 
consider price reactions to earnings announcements conditional on the degree of heterogeneity in 
the interpretations of the earnings news. In this study, we extend the existing analysis by 
incorporating the effect of heterogeneous interpretations of earnings news. Interestingly, we find 
that the earlier conclusion is reversed when significant heterogeneous interpretation is present. 
The literature on heterogeneous interpretations of information and the literature on short 
sale constraints have largely evolved separately.2
                                                 
2 Differences of opinion, a concept closely related to heterogeneous interpretation, are always assumed in the 
literature on short sale constraints. However, the literature on short sale constraints has not paid enough attention to 
how differences of opinion arise and, more importantly, to the pricing effects when differences of opinions arise. 
One exception is Xu (2007). 
 The literature on heterogeneous interpretations 
focuses on the possibility that public information may trigger different interpretations, which 
leads to different opinions and stimulates trading. The extensive studies on short sale constraints 
assume that differences of opinion exist and are reduced over time; as a result, overvaluation is 
corrected over time. A recent study, Xu (2007), joins these two lines of research and analyzes 
how heterogeneous interpretations of public signals contribute to overvaluation. Xu (2007) 
extends Miller’s (1977) intuition to the setting of stock price reactions to public announcements. 
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One key prediction of his study is that heterogeneous interpretations among investors, when 
coupled with short sale constraints, do not offset the effects of one another. Instead, they affect 
equilibrium prices. In particular, Xu (2007) predicts that the selective registration of more 
optimistic opinions under short sale constraints implies stronger price reactions to good news 
than to bad news, and this asymmetry increases with the degree of interpretation heterogeneity 
and short sale constraints. 
Following the literature, we employ institutional ownership as an inverse proxy for short 
sale constraints and abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements as a proxy for 
heterogeneous interpretations of earnings news. We find that price reactions are stronger to bad 
news when investors interpret earnings news homogenously, a result that is consistent with Reed 
(2007) and offers support for Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). However, when interpretations 
become more heterogeneous, price reactions become stronger to good news. This pattern is more 
pronounced when the short sale constraints are more binding. Our findings support the notion 
that, in the presence of short sale constraints, the heterogeneous interpretations of earnings 
announcements have important implications for the price reactions to earnings announcements, 
which is consistent with the predictions based on the selective registration of more optimistic 
opinions (Miller 1977; Xu 2007).  
To further explore the implications of the heterogeneous interpretations of earnings news 
on price reactions to the earnings announcements, we conduct a similar test to that in Berkman et 
al. (2009). We consider first separately and then jointly (1) pre-announcement opinion 
divergence and (2) opinion divergence triggered by heterogeneous interpretations of the earnings 
announcements. Similar to Berkman et al. (2009), we find that when stocks are sorted on pre-
announcement opinion divergence alone, portfolios with greater differences of opinion prior to 
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announcements earn lower returns around earnings announcements. However, when we sort 
stocks on opinion divergence triggered by heterogeneous interpretations of earnings 
announcements, we find that stocks with more heterogeneous interpretations earn significantly 
higher returns. The latter pattern is consistent with the hypothesis of selective registration of 
optimistic interpretations of earnings news. Finally, we double sort firms by both types of 
divergence. We find that stocks with a large degree of pre-announcement opinion divergence, 
but relatively homogeneous interpretations of earnings news, earn the lowest abnormal returns 
around earnings announcements, whereas those with a small degree of pre-announcement 
opinion divergence, but high heterogeneous interpretations of earnings news, earn the highest 
abnormal returns around earnings announcements. The results of this joint test suggest that, 
considering disagreement on earnings implications, earnings announcements may not always 
narrow opinion divergence and correct overvaluation. This paper suggests that the pattern of 
stock price reaction to earnings also reflects  selective registration of more optimistic opinions 
upon earnings announcements. The finding complements that in Berkman et al. (2009) in 
illuminating the implications of short sale constraints on stock price reactions around earnings 
announcements. 
Finally, we explore whether short sale constraints and the heterogeneous interpretations 
of earnings announcements are associated with the pattern of post-earnings-announcement drift 
(PEAD). We find that the patterns observed in the drift window bear some resemblance to those 
observed over the announcement window. If one takes the view of delayed response as a cause 
of PEAD, then these patterns are intuitively appealing. Our findings suggest that short sale 
constraints and heterogeneous interpretations of the announced earnings may also play a role in 
asymmetric PEAD patterns. 
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This paper makes several contributions to accounting literature. First, it contributes to the 
body of accounting research that investigates price and volume reactions to earnings 
announcements. Our empirical evidence suggests a significant interaction between the price and 
volume reactions to earnings announcements. It has been well established that heterogeneous 
interpretations are an important stimulus for trading around earnings announcements. To the 
extent that the abnormal trading volume captures heterogeneous interpretations of earnings news, 
our evidence suggests that heterogeneous interpretations have important implications for price 
reactions to earnings announcements, rather than being cancelled out in the price aggregation 
process. 3 Second, this paper contributes to accounting research that investigates asymmetric 
price reactions to earnings announcements. Our evidence shows that the asymmetric price 
reactions to good news and bad news vary in a systematic way with the degree of heterogeneous 
interpretations and short sale constraints. Basu (1997) hypothesizes stronger price reactions to 
positive than to negative earnings news due to conservative accounting principle. Our study 
offers new insights on the asymmetric price reactions to earnings news. Third, this paper 
complements Berkman et al. (2009) on the implications of short sale constraints on stock returns 
around earnings announcements.4
This paper also contributes to finance literature. First, this study joins the resurgence of 
interest in finance that connects trading activity to prices through the disagreement model. Hong 
  
                                                 
3  As discussed later, although trading volume can be explained by many factors other than heterogeneous 
interpretation, those factors do not play roles in explaining the asymmetric price reaction pattern documented in this 
paper. Hence, they do not nullify the effects of differences of opinion. 
4 Similar to Berkman et al. (2009), Mashruwala et al. (2009) also examine the effect of ex-ante disagreement (i.e. 
opinion divergence prior to earnings announcements) and short sale constraints on returns around earnings 
announcements. They find that absolute return to bad earnings news is greater than absolute return to good earnings 
news, and the asymmetrically larger price reaction to bad news is driven by the very act of missing the consensus 
earnings forecasts. They argue that their results help explain the “torpedo effect” of Skinner and Sloan (2002). 
However, their results seem to contradict prior findings. Hand (2002) points out that the asymmetry proposed by 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) exists only for extreme news with price-scaled earnings surprises greater than 0.7%, while 
more than 80% of earnings surprises in our sample fall into the interval of [-0.1%, 0.1%] 
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and Stein (2007) assert that disagreement models uniquely hold the promise of being able to 
deliver a comprehensive joint account of stock prices and trading volume. Second, most existing 
evidence relies on lower future returns in stocks with more dispersed beliefs and/or higher short 
selling costs to backwardly infer ex ante overpricing.5
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature and develops our hypothesis. Section 3 discusses our research design. Section 4 
describes the data and empirical results. Section 5 provides further analysis, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 Examining the immediate asymmetric 
price reactions to good news versus bad news conditional on the degree of heterogeneous 
interpretation and short sale constraints presents a new perspective to test the idea of selective 
registration of optimistic opinion pioneered by Miller (1977). As the price impact that short-sale 
constraints may have on stocks has important policy implications, we expect that our findings to 
provide useful insights for both policy makers and academic researchers. 
 
2.  Literature review and hypothesis development 
Earnings announcements are among the most important information events by which 
firms disclose information to the market. Accounting research provides extensive evidence that 
earnings announcements convey important information for security valuation. Empirical 
evidence suggests that earnings announcements generate both, yet differential, abnormal price 
and volume reactions. For example, Bamber and Cheon (1995) provide empirical evidence that 
earnings announcements sometimes generate heavy trading but minimal price change, and vice 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Figlewski (1981), Chen et al. (2002), Diether et al. (2002), Jones and Lamont (2002), Asquith, et 
al. (2005), Nagel (2005), and Boehme et al. (2006).  
 9 
versa.6
One of the main sources of differential belief revisions is differential interpretations of 
public announcements (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1993; Kandel and Pearson 1995); that is, despite 
sharing common information, individuals may disagree on the meaning of the information. This 
notion of differential interpretations has a long history, dating back to Bachelier’s (1900) seminal 
thesis on price fluctuations. In the earnings announcement setting, deriving the valuation 
implications of earnings signals is complicated, even for sophisticated financial analysts. This 
complexity leaves ample room for disagreement among investors in interpreting earnings signals 
(Zhang 2006; Francis et al. 2007; Lu 2004).
 Beaver (1968) asserts that an important distinction between the price and volume reaction 
is that the former reflects the aggregate change in the market’s average expectation of the 
company’s prospects attributable to the signal, whereas the latter reflects the heterogeneity of the 
change in the expectations of individual investors. 
7
                                                 
6 Prior studies (e.g., Courtenay et al., 1989) have also provided evidence of differential price and volume reactions to 
information produced during the enactment of new legislations.  
 Kandel and Pearson (1995) provide compelling 
evidence that trading volume is higher around earnings announcements, even without price 
changes, and suggest that the differential interpretation of earnings signals is a strong candidate 
for explaining the phenomenon. Bamber et al. (1999) provide additional support for the idea that 
differential interpretations are an important stimulus for speculative trading around earnings 
announcements. A growing body of accounting research suggests that investors do not interpret 
earnings announcements in a similar manner as the announcements spur the generation of private 
information and the differences in investors’ private information explain the trading volume that 
is not associated with price changes (Kim and Verrecchia 1997; Barron et al. 2002; Hope et al. 
2009). 
7 Lu (2004) provides several pieces of anecdotal evidence that suggest it is challenging for investors, even the most 
sophisticated, to gauge the valuation implications of newly released earnings information. 
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Despite the efforts made to better understand the relationship between heterogeneous 
interpretations of earnings numbers and trading volume around public announcements, the 
question of whether heterogeneous interpretations affect price reactions to public announcements 
has not received much attention.8
The finance literature has evolved in showing how equilibrium asset prices change in the 
presence of heterogeneous beliefs and market frictions. Lintner (1969), for example, shows that 
heterogeneous beliefs about asset value alone do not change capital market equilibrium. Miller 
(1977) considers the combined effects of short sale constraints and differences of opinion on 
stock prices and suggests that when short selling is costly, some pessimistic opinions are kept out 
of the market so that prices tend to reflect more optimistic opinions, leading to upward biases in 
prices. Many studies have further extended Miller’s (1977) overpricing hypothesis. Jarrow (1980) 
and Figlewski (1981) were among the first to model Miller’s (1977) idea rigorously, and more 
recent developments include those made by Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993), Morris 
 Conventional wisdom suggests that differential belief revisions 
should have no effect on price reactions to public announcements, because the different opinions 
of investors are expected to “cancel out” in the aggregation process of equilibrium price 
determination (Lintner 1969; Bamber and Cheon 1995). However, there is an ongoing debate 
about whether prices do indeed always reflect the average unbiased opinion. 
                                                 
8 One exception is Rees and Thomas (2010), who examine the effects of changes in dispersion of investor beliefs on 
stock prices during earnings announcements. They find that the 3-day price reactions to earnings announcements are 
negatively associated with changes in dispersion of individual analysts’ forecasts, which they argue is consistent 
with the cost of capital hypothesis and inconsistent with Miller’s (1977) overpricing hypothesis. As discussed below, 
our paper differs from Rees and Thomas (2010), as we focus on the asymmetric price reactions to good news versus 
bad news using recent theoretical developments in the short sale constraints literature. In addition, Rees and Thomas 
(2010) do not condition their tests on short sale constraints. In fact, the adoption of the changes of dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts before and after earnings announcements as the key proxy for the change of opinion divergence 
may bias against the overpricing hypothesis, because most of the small firms with only one or two analysts 
following (which would arguably be more subject to short sale constraints) would have to be dropped from the 
sample. 
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(1996), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), and Hong et al. (2006).9
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) hold a different view. In a rational expectations 
framework with information asymmetry, they argue that rational investors take the possible 
existence of hidden negative information into consideration when trading. As a result, short sale 
constraints do not bias asset prices upwards, but do affect the adjustment speed of prices to 
private information. In Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), uninformed investors observe only 
public information and informed investors all observe identical private information; thus, there 
are no heterogeneous interpretations. 
  
More recently, Xu (2007) connects the short sale constraints literature with the literature 
on heterogeneous interpretations of public information and extends Miller’s intuition into the 
setting of the price reactions to public announcements. This model predicts that, rather than 
being “cancelled out,” heterogeneous interpretations of the public signal among individual 
investors, coupled with short sale constraints, affect equilibrium prices. Given that short sale 
constraints are, in general, binding and that heterogeneous interpretations may exist in certain 
circumstances, this prediction has important implications for the price reactions to earnings 
announcements.10
Xu (2007) assumes that investors who are prohibited from short selling initially agree on 
the value of a stock, but disagree on the precision of the public signal they have observed. “High-
precision” investors think that the signal’s precision is higher than “low precision” investors do. 
  
                                                 
9 Empirical studies on the effects of short sale constraints on overvaluation include, but are not limited to, Figlewski 
(1981), Chen et al. (2002), Diether et al. (2002), Nagel (2005), Boehme et al. (2006), and Chang et al. (2007).  
10 Xu’s (2007) argument applies to public announcements in general. Unlike earnings announcements, many news 
events are discretionary, and the differential incentives to disclose good versus bad news render the valuation 
implications more difficult to assess. In addition, measures of market expectations are generally lacking. Xu (2007) 
also picks the earnings announcement setting to conduct some preliminary empirical tests on the asymmetry of price 
reactions to good versus bad news, but he does not empirically examine how heterogeneous interpretations and short 
sale constraints affect asymmetry. 
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As a result, “high-precision” investors react more to the news signals than the “low-precision” 
investors do.   
Upon receiving a piece of good news, “high-precision” investors, who react more to the 
news, tend to have higher asset valuation than the “low-precision” investors, who react less. 
Conversely, upon receiving a piece of bad news, “low-precision” investors, who react less to the 
news, tend to have higher asset valuation than the “high-precision” investors who react more. 
Coupled with Miller’s intuition that short sale constraints prevent pessimistic opinions from 
being reflected in prices, Xu (2007) predicts that price reactions should be stronger to good news 
than to bad news, ceteris paribus. This is because in the good news case, price increases to the 
extent to reflect the opinions of those who react the most to the signal, whereas in the bad news 
case, price decreases to the extent to reflect the opinions of those who react the least to the signal. 
Furthermore, because this asymmetry is driven by short sale constraints and heterogeneous 
interpretations of the news, it should increase with the heterogeneity in interpretations of news 
and the costs of short selling.11
 Note that Xu’s (2007) predictions hinge closely on the existence of heterogeneous 
interpretations of a public signal. In the absence of interpretation heterogeneity, Xu (2007) 
suggests no asymmetry in the magnitude of the price reactions to good and bad news. In fact, the 
  
                                                 
11  The prediction, as pointed out by Xu (2007), does not depend on the maintained assumption of investor 
heterogeneity. For example, investors may disagree about whether an announcement represents changes in long-run 
growth trends or merely a temporary fluctuation. This dimension of disagreement can be captured by assuming 
disagreement on the signal’s precision. Assuming that investors differ in the precision of their pre-disclosure 
information but attach the same precision to the public information, as in Kim and Verrecchia (1991), leads to the 
same prediction. Modeling heterogeneous prior confidence and modeling heterogeneous precision in a new public 
signal are conceptually equivalent. Assuming as in Kim and Verrecchia (1997) that investors employ different 
private information, which can be used only in conjunction with a public announcement, will not change the 
prediction either. This is because such an assumption offers only a particular reason about why investors revise their 
beliefs differentially. Finally, the prediction holds if we allow investors to have heterogeneous prior expectations 
about stock value. According to Bayesian updating, disagreement in prior expectations has no implications for value 
updating. In fact, as long as prior asset valuations and interpretations of the new signals are not perfectly negatively 
correlated, the prediction in Xu (2007) holds.  
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existing literature on short sale constraints suggests that when investors exhibit homogeneous 
interpretations of this signal, a stronger price reaction to bad news than to good news may be 
observed. This is because short sale constraints, which also exist before the earnings 
announcements are made, tend to reduce the speed with which prices adjust to private 
information (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987), especially bad news. Suppose that the information 
about earnings is taken to be somewhat private until firms announce those earnings to the public. 
With no heterogeneity in interpretations of these figures, information asymmetry vanishes with 
the announcement and the market clears, allowing prices to adjust fully to the consensus public 
information. On average, the announcement would induce a stronger price reaction to bad 
earnings news.12
The above understanding is important in order to explore the full implications of the 
effect of short sale constraints on the asymmetric price reactions to good and bad news. Given 
that short sale constraints generally exist and differ only in terms of the degree, in the absence of 
heterogeneous interpretations, the delayed incorporation of private information (especially 
negative private information) due to short sale constraints implies that prices react more strongly 
to bad news than to good news when the news become public. As the degree of heterogeneous 
interpretations of the news increases, the selective registration of more optimistic opinions 
imposes an opposite force on the asymmetry, and even leads to an opposite pattern (i.e., prices 
react more strongly to good news than to bad news). This is because the selective registration of 
more optimistic opinions implies a convex function of price in the public signal. Furthermore, 
the patterns described above are expected to be more pronounced when the short sale constraints 
are more binding. We formalize our hypotheses as follows: 
  
                                                 
12 Xu (2007) does not model private information; thus, in his model the impact of short sale constraints on the 
adjustment speed of prices to pre-disclosure private information does not exist.  
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HYPOTHESIS: (1) when investors interpret the earnings news homogenously, prices 
react stronger to bad earnings news than to good earnings news; (2) when investors interpret the 
news more heterogeneously, prices react more strongly to good earnings news than to bad 
earnings news; and (3) the patterns stated in (1) and (2) are more pronounced when short sale 
constraints are more binding. 
 
 
3.  Research design 
3.1.  Proxies for short sale constraints 
Jones and Lamont (2002) suggest that short sale constraints include the various costs and 
risks of shorting, as well as legal and institutional restrictions. 13 Nagel (2005) differentiates 
between two types of short sale constraints: direct and indirect. The direct cost of borrowing is 
reflected in the difference between the rebate rate, which the lender pays to the short seller, and 
the interest rate on cash funds. The indirect costs arise from unfamiliarity with the short selling 
market, institutional constraints, risk and even cultural pressures. The generally low level of 
short selling interests in most stocks and the lack of participation in the short selling market by 
most investors suggest that the indirect constraints on short selling may have an even larger 
effect than the direct short selling costs.14
The existing literature provides several suggestions for how to proxy short sale 
constraints. We follow the more recent literature and employ institutional ownership to inversely 
  
                                                 
13 See Jones and Lamont (2002) for a more thorough discussion of the constraints on short selling. 
14 According to Almazan et al. (2004), 70% of investment managers are precluded from short selling by charter and 
strategy restrictions. Fewer than 10% of those eligible to engage in short selling actually do so. Market short interest 
is typically only about 1.5% of all shares outstanding. 
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proxy for short sale constraints (D’Avolio 2002; Nagel 2005; Asquith et al. 2005; Berkman et al. 
2009).15 Our justification of such a choice is as follows. First, the direct cost of short selling is 
high in stocks with a low degree of institutional ownership. D’Avolio (2002) shows that 
institutional investors are the main suppliers of equity loans. Correspondingly, he finds that the 
degree of institutional ownership can explain much of the variation in loan supplies across stocks, 
and that stocks with a low level of institutional ownership are more expensive to borrow. Second, 
most institutional investors never sell short due to institutional constraints or cultural pressures. 
In the presence of these indirect short sale constraints, sophisticated institutional investors can 
easily sell an overpriced stock that they own, but will not trade against an overpriced stock that 
they do not. As a result, short sale constraints are effectively more binding in stocks owned 
mainly by individual investors; i.e., those with a low degree of institutional ownership (Nagel 
2005).16
 
 
3.2.   Proxies for heterogeneous interpretations 
We employ the abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements to proxy for 
heterogeneous interpretations. Harris and Raviv (1993), and Kandel and Pearson (1995), among 
others, suggest that when the differences in investors’ interpretations of public news are great, 
                                                 
15 Another proxy for short sale constraints used in previous studies is the level of short interest. We do not use this 
proxy because Chen et al. (2002) suggest that it is not a good measure of how binding short sale constraints are. 
They argue that stocks with a low or zero value of short interest may be exactly those that are more costly to sell 
short. Jones and Lamont (2002) suggest that the short stock rebate rate is a better proxy for measuring the magnitude 
of short sale constraints. However, the data on rebate rate are proprietary and available for only a very short time 
period. 
16A number of studies examine the role of institutional ownership in price reactions to earnings announcement. 
Institutional investors are believed to have superior capability to process public information, better access to 
company information, and more incentive to acquire private information. Consistent with this view, prior findings 
show that institutional ownership accelerates the pricing of future earnings (Ayers and Freeman 2003) and the 
change of institutional ownership on subsequent earnings announcement abnormal returns (Ali et al. 2003). In this 
paper, we use institutional ownership as a proxy for short sale constraints and derive predictions from the short sale 
constraints’ perspective. We acknowledge that institutional ownership could proxy for investor sophistication. 
However, this dimension is unlikely to explain the asymmetric price reactions to good news versus bad news 
conditional on abnormal trading volume.  
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the trading volume will be higher. Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Bamber et al. (1999) provide 
empirical evidence that differential interpretations are an important stimulus for trading. 
Obviously, there are also other reasons for trading. For example, volume may reflect liquidity or 
portfolio rebalancing. Trading volume around earnings announcements is also positively related 
to the amount of value-relevant information. As Berkman et al. (2009) point out, these other 
reasons do not nullify the effects of differences of opinion. These other reasons also do not 
explain the asymmetric price reactions to good news and bad news. We choose abnormal trading 
volume (i.e., the average turnover during the earnings announcement event window minus the 
average turnover in a baseline non-event period) to mitigate the influence of the trading volume 
that is due to liquidity needs.17
 
 
3.3.  Data sources and variable definitions 
Our data come from CRSP, COMPUSTAT, I/B/E/S, and the Spectrum database. Our 
sample consists of all common stocks (i.e., CRSP share code of 10 or 11) listed on the 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ during the 1985-2007 period that have the data necessary to calculate 
the earnings surprises (ESURP) and market-adjusted returns (RET) around earnings 
announcements and a share price above one dollar. Our sample begins in 1985 because there are 
                                                 
17 The KP index, which compares analyst forecasts shortly before and after these announcements (see Kandel and 
Pearson 1995), is a potential alternative proxy for differential interpretations of earnings news. However, it requires 
that the same analyst issue forecasts both shortly before and after the earnings announcements. The adoption of this 
measure would thus significantly affect sample size and statistical power, as most of the small firms (arguably more 
subject to short sale constraints) would have to be dropped from the sample. As for the change in dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts, this measure shares the same weakness as the KP index; in addition, it can capture only 
situations where paired forecasts move in opposite directions and diverge, but not situations where paired forecasts 
move in opposite directions and flip. Garfinkel (2009) examines the empirical validity of extant proxies for opinion 
divergence. He finds that measures based on trading volume are highly correlated with his new construct for opinion 
divergence using proprietary data on investors’ orders, while analyst forecast divergence is negatively related to the 
new construct. 
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only a small number of analyst quarterly earnings forecasts prior to that year.  
We obtain our analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S. We use unadjusted (for splits and stock 
dividends) I/B/E/S forecasts to avoid the potential rounding problem pointed out by Payne and 
Thomas (2003). We calculate ESURP as the difference between firm reported quarterly earnings 
per share (EPS) before extraordinary items and the consensus analyst forecast scaled by the stock 
price at the end of the fiscal quarter. The stock price deflator renders earnings surprises 
comparable across stocks and also helps to mitigate heteroscedasticity (Kothari 2001). We 
calculate the consensus forecast as the median value of individual analyst forecasts. To reduce 
contamination from stale forecasts, we use only forecasts made within the 60 days prior to the 
earnings announcement. If one analyst issues more than one forecast within this 60-day window, 
then only the most recent is included.  
From CRSP, we calculate the three-day, [-1, +1], market-adjusted returns (RET) around 
the earnings announcements as a measure of price reactions. The adjustment is based on the 
CRSP value-weighted market return over the same three-day time window. We calculate 
abnormal trading volume (ABVOL) as the average turnover during the three days surrounding the 
earnings announcement minus the average daily turnover in a baseline non-event period. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006), we define the baseline period as the 
45 trading day window from trading day -55 to trading day -11 relative to the earnings 
announcement. Turnover is trading volume divided by shares outstanding. For the NASDAQ 
stocks, we multiply turnover by 0.5, because the volumes on the NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX 
markets are not comparable due to differences in their dealership structures.18
                                                 
18  Atkins and Dyl (1997) and Anderson and Dyl (2005) find that the NASDAQ volume is overstated by 
approximately 70% to 100% relative to the NYSE volume. We follow Nagel (2005) in using 0.5. We also try other 
parameters such as 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8 and obtain similar results.  
 Relative to raw 
volume, ABVOL captures the abnormal trading that is more likely to be due to differential 
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interpretations than to other factors such as liquidity (Kandel and Pearson 1995).  
We obtain our institutional ownership data from the Spectrum database. Following the 
literature (e.g., Nagel 2005), we calculate institutional ownership (IO) as the percentage of shares 
outstanding held by institutional investors, and we use the last reported IO data prior to the 
quarterly earnings announcements. If there is no institutional ownership data available within the 
180 days prior to earnings announcements, then we assume these stocks to have zero institutional 
ownership. Following previous studies (e.g., Berkman et al. 2009), we set IO to missing if it is 
greater than or equal to one. 
 
3.4. Empirical Model 
We estimate the following regression. 
 RETpt = β0 + β1GOODpt+ β2ESURPpt + β3 ESURPpt × GOODpt + Control Variables + εpt, (1) 
where GOOD is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if ESURP is positive and a value of 
zero if it is negative. Observations with zero earnings surprises are excluded. Slope coefficient β3 
captures the asymmetric stock price reactions to good versus bad news, controlling for the 
magnitude of the surprise. To understand the change in asymmetry across groups with different 
degrees of heterogeneous interpretations and short sale constraints, we run the regression 
separately for subsamples that are partitioned on the basis of ABVOL and IO. 
In the main test, we first sort the samples into three groups based on the IO of each stock 
in each quarter. Within each IO group, we further sort the samples into three groups based on the 
ABVOL of each stock surrounding earnings announcements. The low, medium, and high groups 
represent stocks in the bottom 30 percent, middle 40 percent, and top 30 percent of the 
distribution, respectively. Within each IO and ABVOL group, we then form portfolios of the 
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individual stocks by ranking ESURP into 20 portfolios. We estimate regression (1) by defining 
RET as the average return and ESURP as the average earnings surprise of all stocks in each 
earnings surprise portfolio. The dummy variable, GOOD, is coded as one if ESURP is positive, 
zero if it is negative. Similarly, all of the control variables are defined as the average value in 
each earnings surprise portfolio.19
Our hypothesis posits that (1) prices react more strongly to bad news than to good news 
(i.e., β3 is negative) when there is little or no interpretation heterogeneity (i.e., ABVOL is low); (2) 
prices react more strongly to good news than to bad news when investors interpret the news more 
heterogeneously; that is, we expect β3 to increase or even become positive as we move from low 
ABVOL to high ABVOL; and (3) the patterns in (1) and (2) are more pronounced when short 
selling is more costly (i.e., when IO is low).  
 We analyze the regression at the portfolio rather than firm 
level for the following reason. Kinney et al. (2002) find that the means and medians of the 
abnormal stock return distribution for a given level of earnings surprise are reliably positive for 
positive earnings surprise portfolios and reliably negative for negative earnings surprise 
portfolios even for earnings surprises very near zero. However, for a given firm, a positive 
(negative) return conditional on a positive (negative) earnings surprise alone often falls below 
“probable,” where probable is defined as a likelihood of .75 or higher. This finding suggests that 
earnings surprises measure news with noise, which can be mitigated if analysis is conducted at 
the portfolio level. This is particularly important because misclassification of news into good 
news and bad news will hinder the interpretation of results.  
 
3.5.  Control variables 
                                                 
19 As mentioned earlier, in the main analysis, we exclude the firm-quarters with zero earnings surprises and rank 
non-zero ESURP into 20 portfolios. Our results are robust (1) if we include zero ESURP in the ranking and (2) if we 
form 20 portfolios with 10 portfolios among positive ESURP and 10 among negative ESURP.  
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A number of accounting studies have identified a set of factors that affect the price 
reactions to earnings surprises, and we carefully control for these factors. First, we control for 
earnings persistence. Prior studies suggest that the more persistent an earnings surprise, the 
greater the impact an earnings innovation has on market participants’ expectations of future 
earnings. As a result, more persistent earnings surprises lead to larger price changes (e.g., 
Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Easton and Zmijewski 1989). Earlier studies focus on the time-series 
property of earnings. Freeman and Tse (1992) find that the magnitude of |ESURP| provides more 
explanatory power than does the time-series persistence of earnings. More specifically, they find 
that small earnings surprises are valued as more permanent shifts, whereas large earnings 
surprises are valued as more transitory shifts, with the marginal price responses declining to near 
zero as the absolute earnings surprises increase. Following the prior literature (e.g., 
Subramanyam and Wild 1996; Lipe et al. 1998), we include an interaction term between 
|ESURP| and ESURP to control for the S-shaped relationship between price reactions and 
earnings surprises.20
                                                 
20 Our main analysis focuses on absolute price-scaled earnings surprises (|ESURP|) that are less than 5%, which 
eliminates the most extreme transitory surprises at the two tails. However, we still include an interaction term 
between |ESURP| and ESURP, as Freeman and Tse (1992) show that the price reactions to earnings surprises are 
still non-linear in the range of [-5%, 5%]. 
 In addition, we control for the lower valuation implications of earnings 
surprises that consist of special items. Special items are frequently nonrecurring and hence lead 
to a lower persistence of earnings surprises when firms report them in the quarter (Wild et al. 
2001). We separately control for negative and positive special items as they may have different 
implications on valuation. Specifically, we include an interaction term between ESURP and 
NEGSPEC (POSSPEC), where NEGSPEC (POSSPEC) equals the absolute value of special 
items deflated by total assets, if negative (positive), and zero otherwise. 
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In addition to earnings persistence, growth opportunities are also found to be important 
for the association between stock returns and earnings surprises. Prior studies (e.g., Collins and 
Kothari 1989) show that higher growth expectations increase the price responses to earnings. We 
use the ratio of the market-to-book value of equity (M/B) as of the fiscal-quarter end to proxy for 
growth opportunities. Earlier studies also suggest that risk (i.e., the systematic component of the 
volatility of equity cash flows) and the interest rate are important determinants of price reaction 
or the earnings response coefficient (Easton and Zmijewski 1989; Collins and Kothari 1989). 
The price reactions to earnings announcements are expected to decrease with risks and interest 
rates because a higher degree of risk or a high interest rate means a lower discounted present 
value of the revisions in expectations for future earnings innovations. Following the existing 
literature, we measure systematic risk (BETA) using a market model estimated over the year 
ending the day before the start of the relevant fiscal quarter. We measure interest rates by the 
yield on the CRSP 30-year bond index (BOND30) at the end of the fiscal quarter. Finally, we 
control for firm size (SIZE), as price reactions may differ across firms of different sizes due to 
differences in their information environments. We measure it by the market capitalization of the 
stock at the fiscal quarter-end.  
 
4.  Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample consists of 141,328 quarterly earnings announcements of 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks between 1985 and 2007 with the data necessary to calculate 
ESURP and RET.21
                                                 
21 Following Zhang (2008), we exclude observations with (1) a forecast date on or after the corresponding earnings 
announcement date, (2) an earnings announcement before or more than 90 days after the corresponding fiscal 
 Stocks priced below one dollar and observations with zero earnings surprises 
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or price-deflated absolute earnings surprises greater than 5 percent are excluded.22
Table 1 provides preliminary evidence on the asymmetric price reactions to earnings 
surprises. Earnings surprise decile portfolios are formed for each year-quarter using the full 
sample in Panel A, within the subsamples sorted in terms of ABVOL in Panel B, and within the 
subsamples first sorted by IO and then by ABVOL in Panel C. Low, Medium, and High represent 
stocks in the bottom 30 percent, middle 40 percent, and top 30 percent of the distributions in 
each year-quarter, respectively. The mean RET over [-1, +1] around the quarterly earnings 
announcements in each earnings surprise decile portfolio is also reported.  
 
For the sake of brevity, our discussion here focuses on pattern comparisons of the two 
extreme decile portfolios. Panel A shows that in the full sample, the average three-day return 
around earnings announcements is 2.86 percent in the top earnings surprise decile and -1.94 
percent in the bottom earnings surprise decile. The difference in the absolute values of the two 
numbers, as shown in the last column, is 0.92 percent, which suggests that, on average, price 
reactions are stronger to good news than to bad news.  
Panel B further reveals that the pattern of asymmetry in the price reactions to good news 
versus bad news varies across the volume groups. In the low-ABVOL group, price reactions are 
actually stronger to bad news than to good news. The average three-day abnormal return in the 
bottom decile of earnings surprises is -1.39 percent, whereas it is 0.52 percent in the top decile of 
earnings surprises. As we move to the medium- and high-ABVOL groups, the price reactions 
become stronger to good news than to bad news. More specifically, the average three-day 
                                                                                                                                                             
quarter end, and (3) an EPS or forecast greater than 10. We also delete observations with earnings announcement 
dates in COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S (if available) that differ by more than one calendar day, because such 
observations are potentially subject to data error or other irregularities. 
22 Around 96% of price-scaled earnings surprises fall within the [-5%, 5%] range. Earnings surprises greater than 
5% are excluded to avoid the undue influence of extreme values, and zero earnings surprises are excluded because 
our aim is to compare the price reactions to positive and negative news. 
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abnormal return in the top decile of earnings surprises is 5.6 percent, compared to -2.92 percent 
in the bottom decile in the high-ABVOL group.23
Finally, Panel C indicates that the pattern across the ABVOL groups in Panel B can also 
be observed in each IO subgroup, but it is more pronounced in the low-IO group than in the 
high-IO group. In sum, the preliminary evidence presented in Table 1 supports our hypothesis 
that, with little or no interpretation heterogeneity, prices react more strongly to bad earnings 
news than to good news. However, as investors interpret the news more heterogeneously, prices 
react more strongly to good news than to bad news, especially when the short sale constraints are 
more binding.  
  
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. 
Panel A presents the mean and standard deviation (std) of each variable. The mean of the RET is 
positive, 0.4 percent. This finding is consistent with Frazzini and Lamont’s (2007) observation 
that, on average, stock prices rise around earnings announcement dates. On average, 54 percent 
of the firms in each quarter report good news (GOOD); i.e., they beat the analyst forecasts. It is 
noteworthy that there is a significant amount of variation in the ABVOL (mean = 0.26 and std = 
0.56), which is consistent with prior findings that earnings announcements are characterized by a 
significant number of differential interpretations (e.g., Bamber et al. 1999). 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the average cross-sectional correlations of the variables. As 
expected, the three-day market-adjusted returns (RET) are positively correlated with earnings 
surprises (ESURP) and the good news dummy (GOOD). NEGSPEC is negatively correlated with 
ESURP, suggesting that large negative earnings surprises tend to be associated with the 
                                                 
23 Panel B also shows that the absolute values of stock returns around earnings announcements for the two extreme 
earnings surprise portfolios in the high-ABVOL group are much larger than their counterparts in the low-ABVOL 
group. To the extent that trading volume and abnormal trading volumes are highly correlated, this result is consistent 
with previous empirical findings that, on average, absolute price changes and trading volume are positively 
correlated (Karpoff 1987; Bamber and Cheon 1995). 
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recognition of a large negative one-time special item.  Consistent with prior studies, institutional 
ownership (IO) is positively correlated with firm size with the correlation coefficient of 0.47. 
 
4.2. Main Regression Results 
Tables 3 and 4 report the main regression results. Low, Medium, and High represent 
stocks in the bottom 30 percent, middle 40 percent, and top 30 percent of the distribution in each 
year-quarter, respectively. Our sample spans from 1985 to 2007 and consists of 92 quarters.  
Table 3 first reports the estimation regression results for the full sample and then those 
based on the ABVOL subsamples. The first row shows the regression results for the full sample 
without including the control variables. Consistent with Basu’s finding (1997), these results 
show that the slope coefficient (β3) on the interaction term between GOOD and ESURP is 
positive and statistically significant. Basu (1997) attributes the stronger price reaction to good 
news than to bad news to accounting conservatism. He argues that the asymmetrical verification 
requirements for gains and losses under conservative accounting principle imply the timely 
recognition of losses and the gradual recognition of gains. As a result, positive earnings surprises 
may be more persistent and have a larger valuation impact than negative earnings surprises. The 
second row of Table 3 includes the variables that explicitly control for factors such as earnings 
persistence. β3 is still significantly positive but the magnitude is much smaller, which suggests 
that the different implications of earnings persistence for positive and negative earnings news 
that is induced by accounting conservatism is partially captured by the control variables. We next 
turn to the regression results based on the subsamples conditional on ABVOL. If accounting 
conservatism remains the main driver of the asymmetric reactions as observed in the full sample, 
then we would expect a consistent significantly positive β3 across all of the subsamples.  
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As previously discussed, theories of heterogeneous interpretations of earnings news in the 
presence of short sale constraints actually predict a systematic pattern of β3 across the subsample 
portfolios sorted by ABVOL. β3 is expected to be negative in the low-ABVOL sample and to 
increase in value as we move from the low- to the high-volume groups, and the results in Table 3 
are consistent with this prediction. More specifically, the estimated β3 is -0.53 for the low-
ABVOL group and increases monotonically to 1.30 for the high-ABVOL group. The difference, 
1.82, reported in the bottom row of the table, is highly significant.24
The estimation results on the other variables are in line with the prior literature. 
Consistent with Freeman and Tse (1992), the coefficient on the interaction term between 
earnings surprises and the absolute value of earnings surprises (γ1) is negative. These results hold 
for the full sample and all three ABVOL-sorted subsamples, and they support the conjecture that 
the marginal response of stock prices to an earnings surprise declines as the absolute magnitude 
of that surprise increases. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between earnings 
surprises and NEGSPEC, POSSPEC, the M/B, BETA and BOND30 are largely in the predicted 
directions, although not always significant, across the different ABVOL groups. The adjusted-R2 
varies across the different ABVOL groups, ranging from 27.30% in the low ABVOL group to 
56.26% in the high ABVOL group. The results suggest that earnings announcements (good news 
or bad news) on average convey less value-relevant new information in the low ABVOL group 
than in the high ABVOL group. 
  
Table 4 reports the regression results for the subsamples of double-dependent sorting: 
first by IO and then by ABVOL. Our purpose here is to test the hypothesis that the asymmetry is 
                                                 
24 Following Petersen’s (2009) suggestion, we calculate the t-statistics using clustered (by time) standard errors to 
account for the cross-sectional residual dependence within each year-quarter. Throughout the paper, the terms 
“highly significant,” “significant,” and “weakly significant” refer to significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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more pronounced for low-IO stocks, which are arguably more bound by short sale constraints 
and thus tend to have greater short selling costs and risks. Consistent with our prediction, the 
increase in the estimation of β3 with abnormal trading volume can be observed for the low- and 
medium-IO groups, but not for the high-IO group. For the low-IO group, the β3 coefficients 
exhibit exactly the same pattern as that shown in the lower panel of Table 3. The coefficients for 
the low- and high-ABVOL groups are -0.51 (t = -2.86) and 1.24 (t = 3.50), respectively, and the 
difference (1.76) is significant at the 1% level. A similar but milder pattern also holds for the 
medium-IO group. The difference between the two β3 coefficients is 1.21, which is also 
significant at the 1% level. However, β3 is not significant for any of the volume groups for the 
high-IO group.  
The results in Table 4 reinforce our finding in Table 3 that ABVOL, which measures the 
degree of heterogeneity in interpretations of earnings news, plays an important role in explaining 
the asymmetric price reactions to good versus bad news. Moreover, these results confirm the 
importance of the effect of short sale constraints, as we observe no ABVOL effect on price 
reaction asymmetry in the subsample in which stocks are subject to less binding short sale 
constraints.   
In sum, Tables 3 and 4 provide evidence that when interpretations of earnings news are 
more heterogeneous, prices react more strongly to good news than to bad, and the effect is more 
pronounced when the short sale constraints are more binding. This evidence supports the notion 
that heterogeneous interpretations of earnings announcements have important implications for 
the price reactions to these announcements in the presence of short sale constraints.  
 
5.  Future analysis 
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5.1 Implications of heterogeneous interpretations on stock returns around earnings 
announcements  
Berkman et al. (2009) argue that, on average, public announcements (including earnings 
announcements) reduce differences of opinion among investors. They propose that, if 
overvaluation exists under short sale constraints, 25
The ideas and evidence presented in Berkman et al. (2009) are consistent with the 
conventional view that when new information is released, differences of opinion among 
investors tend to be reduced. This view is certainly correct when investors interpret the news 
homogeneously. However, whether it is correct when investors interpret the news 
heterogeneously is less clear. In fact, it is well accepted that increased heterogeneity can be 
induced by a new piece of information. Consequently, in certain cases, we would expect 
increased rather than decreased divergence following a news event such as an earnings 
announcement (Kothari 2001).  
 then stocks that are subject to higher 
differences of opinion and more binding short sale constraints earn significantly lower returns 
around earnings announcements. Their empirical evidence is consistent with this conjecture, thus 
lending support to Miller’s (1977) overpricing hypothesis.  
In this paper, we explicitly examine the implications of the heterogeneous interpretations 
on stock returns around earnings announcements under the condition of short sale constraints. 
We argue that another type of overpricing could actually arise around announcements due to the 
selective registration of opinions in the face of constraints.  
To better understand the implications of the findings of this paper and those of Berkman 
                                                 
25 Berkman et al. (2009) attribute the overvaluation to speculative trading before earnings announcements. More 
specifically, they propose that investors with heterogeneous expectations on the forthcoming earnings engage in 
speculative trading. In the presence of short sale constraints, optimists are more likely to buy than pessimists are to 
sell short, leading to overvaluation prior to earnings announcements. 
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et al. (2009), we perform joint analysis in this section. Following Berkman et al. (2009), we use a 
volume measure, TURN, as a proxy for differences of opinion prior to earnings 
announcements.26 We continue to use ABVOL to proxy for the heterogeneous interpretations of 
earnings news; i.e., differences of opinion triggered by the earnings news. TURN is measured by 
the average turnover from trading day -55 to trading day -11 relative to earnings announcements. 
ABVOL is the average three-day turnover around earnings announcements minus the average 
turnover from trading day -55 to trading day -11 relative to these announcements.27
Holding TURN constant, we expect more positive average returns for stocks with high 
ABVOL than for those with low ABVOL because of the selective registration of optimistic 
opinions hypothesized in this paper. Holding ABVOL constant, we expect more negative average 
returns for stocks with high TURN than for those with low TURN because the former tend to be 
more overpriced. If both ideas are independently valid in applicable circumstances, together, we 
expect that the average abnormal returns around earnings announcements will be lowest for 
stocks with high TURN and low ABVOL and highest for those with low TURN and high ABVOL. 
  
To be consistent with Berkman et al. (2009), we restrict our sample to the 1985 to 2005 
period with earnings announcement dates and stock return information available. We exclude 
firms in the financial (SIC Codes 6000 to 6999) and regulated industries (SIC Codes 4900 to 
                                                 
26 Berkman et al. (2009) employ five different proxies for differences of opinion prior to earnings announcements. 
We choose TURN in our replication because it is a volume-based proxy and closely related to our proxy. 
27 Following the prior literature (e.g., Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006), we use the time interval between two earnings 
announcements as the non-event window to obtain ABVOL. This baseline volume happens to be the same window 
that Berkman et al. (2009) use to form TURN, a proxy for pre-announcement differences of opinion. There may be 
concerns that the mechanical relationship between TURN and ABVOL is driving the results. As shown in Panel C of 
this section, however, the average observation in the high- (low-)TURN group is not greatly concentrated in the low- 
(high-)ABVOL group. In fact, only 37.7% of observations in the high TURN group fall into the low ABVOL group, 
and only 14.6% of observations in the high ABVOL group fall into the low TURN group. The finding presented in 
Panel C further rules out the possibility that the results associated with ABVOL are driven by the mechanical 
relationship between ABVOL and TURN. Nonetheless, we also try an alternative baseline window using one year 
ending -55 prior to earnings announcements (i.e., the ending date prior to the window for the TURN measure), and 
our results remain qualitatively the same. 
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4999). We further exclude the earnings announcements of firms with $10 million or less in total 
assets, $10 million or less in the market value of equity, and those whose stock is priced at less 
than $1 per share, as reported on COMPUSTAT at the start of the current fiscal quarter. Our 
final sample consists of 274,529 firm-quarters. 
Panel A of Table 5 replicates the main finding in Berkman et al. (2009). We first report 
the average three-day market-adjusted abnormal returns for portfolios formed on the basis of 
TURN. 28
Panel B of Table 5 repeats the analysis in Panel A, except that we replace TURN with 
ABVOL, our proxy for heterogeneous interpretations of earnings announcements. In the presence 
of short sale constraints, the selective registration of more optimistic opinions would suggest an 
upward pressure on the price, and the greater the heterogeneity in interpretations of the earnings 
news (ABVOL), the higher the returns around earnings announcements (RET). This is exactly 
what we find in Panel B. The first row of this panel suggests that firms with high ABVOL earn 
 We then examine the joint effect of TURN (opinion difference) and IO (institutional 
ownership) on earnings announcement period returns using two-dimensional sequential sorts, 
first sorting the firms into three IO portfolios and then within each IO portfolio sorting them into 
three TURN portfolios. Low, Medium, and High represent stocks in the bottom 30 percent, 
middle 40 percent, and top 30 percent of the distribution, respectively. Consistent with Berkman 
et al. (2009), these result shows that (1) the average abnormal earnings announcement period 
returns are significantly lower in the high TURN portfolio than in the low TURN portfolio, and (2) 
this pattern exists only in the low- and medium-IO groups.  
                                                 
28 To be consistent, we strictly follow Berkman et al. (2009). We first compute the average three-day abnormal 
return for every portfolio in each of the 84 calendar quarters. The reported portfolio returns are precision-weighted 
averages of this sequence of quarterly averages, where the number of observations in each quarter is used to proxy 
for the precision of the quarterly average.  
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significantly higher average returns than do firms with low ABVOL.29 Further evidence from the 
two-dimensional sequential sorts on ABVOL and IO suggests that this pattern is more 
pronounced when stocks are more difficult to sell short (when IO is low).30
Panel C explores the joint implications of TURN and ABVOL. We independently sort the 
stocks into three TURN portfolios and three ABVOL portfolios. The average observations per 
quarter and the average three-day market-adjusted market returns in each of the 3-by-3 portfolios 
are reported. This presentation format allows several insights into the individual and joint effects 
of TURN and ABVOL. First, the average abnormal returns always increase when we move down 
the table from high TURN to low TURN and to the right from low ABVOL to high ABVOL, thus 
corroborating our findings in Panels A and B. Second, when ABVOL is low (i.e., when 
interpretations of earnings announcements are more homogeneous), the average abnormal 
returns are negative in all three TURN groups and the most negative in the high TURN group. 
These results are consistent with the conjecture made by Berkman et al. (2009) that earnings 
announcements correct overvaluation, especially that of stocks with highly dispersed opinions 
prior to the announcements. However, when ABVOL is high, we observe the opposite: abnormal 
returns are, on average, positive, which is consistent with our expectation that, due to the 
selective registration of optimistic opinions, the greater the heterogeneity in interpretations of 
earnings news, the higher the returns around earnings announcements. Finally, we observe that 
 
                                                 
29 Rees and Thomas (2010) find a negative relationship between the stock returns around earnings announcement 
and the change of trading volume. They focus on the change of trading volume before (trading day -20 to trading 
day -2) and after (trading day +2 to trading day +20). We focus on the trading volume around the earnings 
announcement (trading day -1 to trading day +1) as trading volume around the announcement better captures 
heterogeneous interpretations triggered by the public announcement. 
30 Hong and Stein (2007) suggest that news announcements may simultaneously spark increased disagreement 
among those investors who were already following the stock and grab the attention of those who were not. They 
further argue that in either case, the same end result is expected: both more trading volume and—in the presence of a 
short sale constraint—concurrent upwards pressure on the price. The attention-grabbing story has drawn attention in 
the recent literature (e.g., Frazzini and Lamont 2007). We believe that both attention grabbing and increased 
disagreement contribute the observed phenomenon. Disentangling these two effects is beyond the scope of our study. 
 
 31 
the cell with the highest TURN and lowest ABVOL has the lowest average abnormal returns (-
0.76%), whereas that with the lowest TURN and highest ABVOL has the highest (3.80%). Our 
findings suggest that these two volume measures capture different effects, with the former being 
driven by pre-earnings announcement speculation and the latter by differential interpretations of 
the earnings announcements. We feel that the findings of this joint analysis are both interesting 
and important, as they shed light on the interplay between the price and volume effects of 
earnings announcements from a different angle. The return pattern suggests that, on one hand, 
earnings announcements constitute a corrective force for the possible overvaluation induced by 
speculative purchasing prior to these announcements being made. On the other hand, they can 
trigger disagreement, and selective registration due to short sale constraints gives rise to 
overpricing. 
 
5.2. Implications of heterogeneous interpretation on PEAD 
In this section, we explore the implications of the short-run asymmetric price effects due 
to short sale constraints and heterogeneous interpretations of earnings announcements on the 
long-standing PEAD anomaly. Lerman et al. (2008) assert that, despite decades of research, we 
are still unsure why the PEAD exists, but we know empirically that it is generally larger for 
smaller, lower-priced, less-liquid firms with less institutional following (e.g., Latane and Jones 
1979; Bernard and Thomas 1989; Bhushan 1994; Bartov et al. 2000). Although the two strains of 
theoretical literature cited in this paper (i.e., heterogeneous interpretations of public information 
and short sale constraints) offer predictions about the peculiar asymmetric patterns of the 
immediate price reactions to earnings announcements, they remain silent about the possible 
shapes taken by PEAD for portfolios sorted by either ABVOL or IO or both.  
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The existing empirical literature offers a number of clues about PEAD patterns. For 
example, Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) argue that PEAD can be tied in part to the divergence in 
investors’ opinions, as they find a positive correlation between the abnormal trading volume in 
the three-day period around earnings announcements and abnormal returns over the subsequent 
60 trading days. Reed (2007) argues that the costs of short selling reduce the information 
efficiency (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987) of private information before these announcements, 
and the same logic can be extended to the earnings announcement setting if the price reactions to 
the earnings news are incomplete or if information asymmetry does not vanish upon the earnings 
news being publicized. In particular, the full incorporation of negative earnings surprises would 
be further delayed. To the extent that PEAD is related to the delayed incorporation of 
information into prices, as suggested by the mounting evidence in the PEAD literature, the 
asymmetry patterns in three-day returns may carry over to the longer time window over which 
PEAD occurs. The purpose of this section is thus to join the aforementioned empirical literature 
by documenting the additional stylized PEAD patterns for stocks with various degrees of short 
sale constraints and heterogeneous earnings interpretations. 
Table 6 provides our empirical analysis of these returns over the drift window following 
good news and bad news. To be consistent with our main analysis, we use the same sample; i.e., 
that consisting of 141,328 quarterly earnings announcements of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms 
from 1985 to 2007.31
                                                 
31 To maintain consistency with our three-day return analysis, our sample excludes zero earnings surprises and price-
deflated absolute earnings surprises greater than 5%. We repeat our analysis including all earnings surprises, and the 
results are qualitatively the same. 
 Following the tradition of the PEAD literature (e.g., Bernard and Thomas 
1989; Bartov et al. 2000; Zhang 2008), we use 60-day size-adjusted returns starting from two 
days after the earnings announcements and ending 61 days after the earnings announcements. 
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More specifically, RET60 is abnormal returns adjusted for returns of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
firms of the same size decile. For brevity, we report only the average size-adjusted abnormal 
returns for the portfolio with ESURP ranked in the highest and lowest deciles, as well as the 
hedge returns with a long position in the high-ESURP group and a short position in the low-
ESURP. We also report the percentage of the hedge returns that comes from the long position. 
This measure offers insights into the magnitude of abnormal returns following good news (D10) 
relative to that following bad news (D1); i.e., it is a measure of asymmetry. As previously 
mentioned, we employ institutional ownership (IO) to inversely proxy for short sale constraints 
and the abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements (ABVOL) to proxy for 
heterogeneous interpretations of earnings news.32
Panel A of Table 6 reports PEAD conditional on ABVOL. Consistent with the prior 
literature, we find that post-earnings-announcement returns are positively related to ABVOL 
(Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006; Lerman et al. 2008) 
 Low, Medium, and High represent stocks in 
the bottom 30 percent, middle 40 percent, and top 30 percent of the distribution, respectively. 
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32 We continue to use the abnormal trading volume in the three-day announcement window to proxy for opinion 
divergence over the drift period. We argue that the disagreement around this three-day window reflects the nature of 
the earnings news. If the news is more difficult to interpret over the three-day window, then we expect the 
divergence of opinion about it continue to be greater over the drift window relative to news that is easy to interpret. 
 and that hedging portfolio returns with long 
(short) positions in the top (bottom) decile of earnings surprises also increase with ABVOL 
(Lerman et al. 2008). Hedging returns monotonically increase from 2.65% (low ABVOL) to 
4.53% and then to 5.91% (high ABVOL). However, the sources of the hedging portfolio returns 
differ between the low- and high-ABVOL groups. In the low ABVOL group, the absolute value of 
33Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) interpret investor opinion divergence as a relevant risk factor and attribute the 
positive relationship between abnormal trading volume and subsequent returns to fair compensation for risk. 
Anderson et al. (2007) support the notion that opinion divergence is a risk factor that is priced. However, Lerman et 
al. (2008) argue that several pieces of evidence seem inconsistent with this risk explanation and suggest the greater 
demand associated with stock visibility as an alternative explanation. In this study, we do not intend to offer an 
explanation for the association between abnormal volume and return per se; instead, we explore the asymmetry of 
subsequent stock returns following good news versus bad news, conditional on abnormal volume and short sale 
constraints. 
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the abnormal returns following bad news is larger than that following good news. This 
asymmetry is reversed in the high-ABVOL group. More specifically, in the low-ABVOL group, 
the abnormal return to the short position in the lowest ESURP decile is -2.57%, whereas that to 
the long position in the highest ESURP decile is 0.08%. In the high-ABVOL group, the abnormal 
return in the bottom decile of ESURP is -0.93%, whereas that in the top decile of ESURP is 
4.98%. The return pattern resembles the conditional (on ABVOL) asymmetry of good news 
versus bad news in the three-day reaction window. This seems to suggest that prices continue to 
react to earnings announcements and that the asymmetry in the three-day window is carried over.  
Panel B of Table 6 attempts to show the extent to which the degree of short sale 
constraints affects the asymmetry of abnormal returns following good versus bad news in the 
drift window. There are a few interesting observations. First, all three sets of IO-sorted portfolios 
preserve the major patterns across the ABVOL-sorted portfolios in Panel A. Second, further 
sorting the stocks based on IO, in general, amplifies the ABVOL effect on PEAD. Conditional on 
comparable levels of ABVOL, the lower the IO, the higher the hedging portfolio returns. These 
results hold in all three sets of ABVOL portfolios. Thus, to take advantage of the PEAD anomaly, 
a zero-investment long-short portfolio focused on stocks with low IO and high ABVOL would 
generate the highest abnormal returns. If PEAD is a result of gradually impounding information 
into stock prices for whatever reason, then the foregoing results suggest that short sale 
constraints and the heterogeneous interpretations of announced earnings may both play a role in 
the impediment. Third, we note that the proportion of hedge returns from the long position in 
good news stocks is generally lower when IO is low. One possible explanation is that during the 
longer time window of 60 days, the negative opinions previously withheld by short sale 
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constraints gradually find their way into the price, thus increasing the magnitude of the drift 
following bad news.34
Bernard and Thomas (1989, p. 28) observe that the abnormal returns to the short position 
over 60 and 180 post-announcement days are 1.9% and 4.4%, respectively, compared to 2.8% 
and 5.4% to the long position.
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 A similar asymmetric pattern (i.e., greater abnormal returns for 
the long position than for the short position) can also be found using different time periods and 
different earnings surprise measures (e.g., Collins and Hribar 2000; Doyle et al. 2006; Lerman et 
al. 2008; Ng et al. 2008). Bernard and Thomas (1989) point out that the transaction cost story 
cannot fully explain this pattern, because to compensate for restrictions on short sales, one would 
expect returns to the short position to exceed those to the long position. Under the delayed 
response framework, prices continue to react to earnings news beyond the announcement 
window. With this view in mind, we argue that the selective registration of more optimistic 
opinions over the drift window potentially offer an explanation for the asymmetry. The 
relationship between the abnormal trading volume and the asymmetry of the drift following good 
news versus the drift following bad news is consistent with this conjecture.  
6.  Conclusion 
Heterogeneous interpretations have received growing attention in both the accounting and 
finance literature. It is now well recognized that even when individuals observe common 
information, they may still disagree about its implications. A number of accounting studies have 
                                                 
34 Consistent with other recent work, we use a low degree of institutional ownership to proxy for more binding short 
sale constraints. In the PEAD literature, a low degree of institutional ownership is also used to proxy for less 
sophisticated investors. The patterns revealed in Panel B suggest that institutional ownership seems to capture both. 
35 Bernard and Thomas (1989) observe that the abnormal returns for short positions are larger than those for long 
positions when abnormal returns involve summing daily returns. However, they point out that summing returns can 
introduce noise, and hence they draw inferences based on compounding the returns. 
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examined how heterogeneous interpretations affect the volume reactions to public 
announcements (e.g., Kandel and Pearson 1995; Bamber and Cheon 1995; Bamber et al. 1999). 
In the setting of the price reactions to earnings announcements, prior studies generally assume 
that these price reactions reflect average opinions; hence, they are unaffected by differences of 
opinion. We provide compelling evidence to show that the heterogeneous interpretations of 
earnings announcements have important implications for the price reactions to these 
announcements in the presence of short sale constraints. More specifically, we provide evidence 
to show that with little or no interpretation heterogeneity, the price reactions are stronger to bad 
news. However, when interpretations become more heterogeneous, price reactions become 
stronger to good news. This pattern is more pronounced when short sale constraints are more 
binding.  As heterogeneous interpretations are considered as one important source of abnormal 
trading volume, our evidence on the significant interplay between the price and volume reactions 
to earnings announcements also adds to the resurgence of interest in connecting trading activity 
to prices through the disagreement model (Hong and Stein 2007). 
A recent related study carried out by Berkman et al. (2009) also investigates the price 
reactions to earnings announcements under short sale constraints and different opinions. They 
hypothesize that, under short sale constraints, speculative trading prior to earnings 
announcements leads to overpricing, which is then corrected by the announcements. The 
intuition is that earnings announcements reduce prior opinion divergence and consequently 
reduce overvaluation. We perform joint analysis of the price reaction effects by taking into 
account both pre-announcement opinion divergence and opinion divergence triggered by 
heterogeneous interpretations of the earnings news. We find that when firms are double-sorted 
by both types of divergence, stocks with a large degree of pre-announcement opinion divergence, 
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but homogeneous interpretations of earnings news, earn the lowest abnormal returns around 
earnings announcements, whereas those with a small degree of pre-announcement opinion 
divergence, but more heterogeneous interpretations of earnings news, earn the highest abnormal 
returns around earnings announcements. We conclude that the effect identified in this paper 
plays an equally important role to that identified in Berkman et al. (2009) in understanding the 
implications of short sale constraints on stock returns around earnings announcements. The 
evidence presented here confirms the double-role notion of earnings announcements. Namely, 
whereas earnings announcements typically narrow the heterogeneity of prior beliefs to a certain 
degree by resolving the uncertainty about the earnings news, increased heterogeneity is also 
possible if market participants differ in the way in which they interpret the earnings 
announcements (Kothari 2001).  
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Table 1 Asymmetric Price Reactions to Earnings Surprises: Using a Three-Day Reaction Window 
 
This table reports the mean abnormal returns (RET) for decile portfolios based on the price-scaled earnings surprises (ESURP). RET is the three-day, [-1, 
1], return around the quarterly earnings announcements adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted market return. ESURP is the difference between firm 
reported quarterly earnings per share (EPS) before extraordinary items and the consensus analyst forecast scaled by the stock price at the fiscal quarter-
end. Consensus analyst forecast is the median analyst forecasts made within 60 days prior to the earnings announcement date. Panel A forms the earnings 
surprise portfolios in the full sample. Panel B forms the earnings surprise portfolios within the subsamples sorted in terms of abnormal trading volume 
(ABVOL) by each year-quarter. Panel C forms the earnings surprise portfolios within the subsamples first sorted by institutional ownership (IO) and then 
by abnormal trading volume (ABVOL) by each year-quarter. Abnormal trading volume (ABVOL) is the average turnover over [-1, +1] minus the average 
turnover over [-55, -11] relative to the earnings announcements. Turnover is trading volume divided by the shares outstanding, multiplied by 0.5 for 
NASDAQ stocks. IO is the last reported percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors within the 180 days prior to the earnings 
announcements. Low, Medium, and High represent stocks in the bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30% of the distribution, respectively. Stocks priced 
below one dollar are excluded. Zero earnings surprises and price-deflated absolute earnings surprises greater than 5% are also excluded. The final sample 
consists of 141,328 quarterly earnings announcements of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms from 1985 to 2007 with the data necessary to calculate ESURP 
and RET. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
  D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 |D10|-|D1| 
 Full Sample -1.94% -1.46% -1.26% -0.88% -0.26% 0.74% 1.46% 1.80% 2.48% 2.86% 0.92% 
 
Panel B: Sort on Abnormal Trading Volume (ABVOL) 
  D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 |D10|-|D1| 
 Low ABVOL -1.39% -1.13% -0.87% -0.68% -0.22% 0.17% 0.26% 0.34% 0.62% 0.52% -0.87% 
 Medium ABVOL -1.44% -0.87% -0.63% -0.21% 0.23% 0.89% 1.35% 1.59% 1.75% 2.26% 0.82% 
 High ABVOL -2.92% -2.87% -2.38% -2.15% -0.63% 1.43% 2.89% 3.72% 4.93% 5.60% 2.68% 
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Panel C: Sort on Institutional Ownership (IO) and Abnormal Trading Volume (ABVOL) 
  D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 |D10|-|D1| 
High IO 
Low ABVOL -0.55% -0.52% -0.46% -0.35% 0.07% 0.32% 0.50% 0.69% 0.85% 0.81% 0.26% 
Medium ABVOL -0.43% -0.20% -0.06% -0.27% 0.48% 1.11% 1.82% 1.83% 2.25% 1.98% 1.54% 
High ABVOL -2.92% -3.11% -2.89% -2.39% -0.56% 0.67% 2.99% 3.40% 4.05% 5.08% 2.16% 
             
Median IO 
Low ABVOL -1.37% -1.16% -0.89% -0.57% -0.10% 0.07% 0.35% 0.42% 0.50% 1.00% -0.36% 
Medium ABVOL -1.12% -0.72% -0.62% -0.14% 0.31% 0.81% 1.40% 1.54% 1.68% 2.24% 1.12% 
High ABVOL -2.88% -2.86% -2.81% -2.24% -0.47% 1.31% 2.48% 3.97% 5.29% 5.29% 2.42% 
             
Low IO 
Low ABVOL -1.85% -1.39% -1.17% -1.06% -0.74% -0.22% -0.08% -0.03% 0.23% 0.11% -1.74% 
Medium ABVOL -1.87% -1.51% -0.86% -0.63% -0.01% 0.74% 1.10% 0.96% 1.55% 1.74% -0.13% 
High ABVOL -3.45% -3.00% -2.33% -1.45% -0.49% 2.08% 3.20% 4.17% 4.88% 6.29% 2.84% 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Main Regression Analysis 
 
RET is the three-day, [-1, 1], return around the quarterly earnings announcements, adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted market return. ESURP is the 
difference between firm reported quarterly earnings per share (EPS) before extraordinary items and the consensus analyst forecast scaled by the stock 
price at the fiscal quarter-end. Consensus analyst forecast is the median value of individual analyst forecasts made within the 60 days prior to the earnings 
release date. If an analyst issued more than one forecast within this 60-day window, then only the most recent is used. GOOD is a dummy variable coded 
as one if ESURP is positive and zero if negative. NEGSPEC (in %) is the absolute value of special items deflated by total assets if negative, and zero 
otherwise. POSSPEC (in %) is the value of special items deflated by total assets if positive, and zero otherwise. M/B is the market-to-book ratio at the 
fiscal quarter-end. BETA is the systematic risk measured through a market model estimated over the year ending the day before the start of the relevant 
fiscal quarter. BOND30 (in %) is the yield on the CRSP 30-year bond index at the end of the fiscal quarter. SIZE is the market capitalization of the stock 
at the fiscal quarter-end. We take the logarithm of SIZE to adjust for its asymmetric distribution. To mitigate the influence of extreme values, we truncate 
M/B and BETA at the 1% and 99% level. We truncate NEGSPEC and POSSPEC at the 99% level. ABVOL is the average turnover over [-1, +1] minus the 
average turnover over [-55, -11] relative to the earnings announcements. Turnover is trading volume divided by shares outstanding, multiplied by 0.5 for 
NASDAQ stocks. IO (in %) is the last reported percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors within the 180 days prior to the earnings 
announcements. Stocks priced below one dollar are excluded. Zero earnings surprises and price-deflated absolute earnings surprises greater than 5% are 
also excluded. The final sample consists of 141,328 quarterly earnings announcements of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms from 1985 to 2007 with the 
data necessary to calculate ESURP and RET. Panel A reports the means and standard deviations. Panel B reports the Pearson correlations.  
  RET ESURP GOOD NEGSPEC POSSPEC M/B BETA BOND30 LogSIZE ABVOL IO 
  Panel A: Means and Standard Deviations 
Mean 0.004 -0.001 0.542 0.161 0.018 2.987 0.960 6.247 6.524 0.264 49.877 
Standard deviation 0.079 0.009 0.498 0.673 0.109 2.512 0.557 1.417 1.720 0.558 23.849 
  Panel B: Cross-sectional Correlations 
RET  0.154 0.195 -0.018 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.012 0.000 0.014 0.015 
ESURP   0.571 -0.334 0.094 0.028 -0.026 -0.008 0.056 0.019 0.030 
GOOD    -0.207 0.077 0.046 -0.015 -0.038 0.035 0.015 0.040 
NEGSPEC     -0.040 0.071 0.072 -0.071 0.022 0.031 0.043 
POSSPEC      0.002 0.012 -0.023 0.036 0.019 0.034 
M/B       0.190 -0.125 0.196 0.117 0.044 
BETA         -0.097 0.174 0.247 0.225 
BOND30          -0.209 -0.203 -0.316 
LogSIZE           0.103 0.473 
ABVOL                       0.245 
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Table 3  
Asymmetric Price Reactions to Earnings Surprises: Effects of Abnormal Trading Volume 
 
RET = β0 +β1GOOD +β2ESURP +β3ESURP×GOOD +γ1ESURP×|ESURP| +γ2ESURP×NEGSPEC +γ3ESURP×POSSPEC +γ4ESURP×M/B + γ5ESURP×BETA 
+ γ6ESURP×BOND30 +γ7ESURP×LogSIZE
 
The regression variables are defined in Table 2. We sort the samples into three groups based on abnormal trading volume (ABVOL) by each year-quarter. 
Low, Medium, and High represent stocks in the bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30% of the distribution, respectively. Within each ABVOL group, we 
form portfolios of the individual stocks by ranking earnings surprise (ESURP) into 20 portfolios. We estimate the regression separately for the low-, 
medium-, and high-ABVOL groups, defining RET as the average return and ESURP as the average earnings surprise of all stocks in each earnings surprise 
portfolio. The dummy variable, GOOD, is coded as one if ESURP is positive and coded as zero if negative. Similarly, all of the control variables are 
defined as the average value in each earnings surprise portfolio. To mitigate the influence of extreme values, we truncate M/B and BETA at the 1% and 
99% level. We truncate NEGSPEC and POSSPEC at the 99% level. The full sample consists of 141,328 quarterly earnings announcements of 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms from 1985 to 2007 with the data necessary to calculate ESURP and RET. Stocks priced below one dollar are excluded. 
Zero earnings surprises and price-deflated absolute earnings surprises greater than 5% are also excluded. Following Petersen (2009), we calculate the t-
statistics using clustered (by time) standard errors to account for the cross-sectional residual dependence within each year-quarter. T statistics are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
  βB0 βB1B βB2B βB3B γB1B γB2B γB3B γB4B γB5B γB 6 B γB7 B 
Sample Adj.-R2 
(%) size 
Full Sample 
***-0.010 ***0.023 ***0.367 ***0.777 
       1840 64.47 
(-18.17) (28.91) (5.59) (7.70) 
 ***-0.005 ***0.015 ***2.016 **0.458 ***-5.044 *-0.207 ***-4.979 *0.229 -0.334 -0.037 0.084 1840 68.46 Full Sample 
 (-10.50)  (20.25)  (3.27)  (2.47 ) (-7.95)  (-1.72)  (-2.68) (1.89 ) (-1.34)  (-0.94 ) (1.06)    
              
Low  ABVOL ***-0.004  ***0.007  ***1.471  ***-0.529  ***-2.403  -0.150  0.074  -0.029  -0.007  -0.014  -0.004  1840 27.30 
 (-7.47)  (7.36)  (2.86 ) (-3.58)  (-3.41)  (-1.60 ) (0.05 ) (-0.38)  (-0.03)  (-0.40)  (-0.05)    
Med. ABVOL **-0.001  ***0.012  0.717  -0.096  ***-2.598  **-0.267  -0.846  ***0.331  -0.053  -0.020  0.076  1840 50.85 
 (-2.28 ) (13.55) (1.20 ) (-0.57)  (-3.76)  (-1.90)  (-0.55 ) (3.23)  (-0.16 ) (-0.50)  (0.80)    
High ABVOL ***-0.014  ***0.032  1.143  ***1.295  ***-7.269  **-0.413  **-3.980  **0.362  *-0.259  -0.102  **0.445  1840 56.26 
 (-8.08)  (14.60 ) (0.86 ) (3.94 ) (-6.67)  (-2.22)  (-2.05)  (2.25)  (-0.61)  (-1.34)  (2.41)    
High - Low    ***1.824          
        (4.85)                   
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Table 4 
Asymmetric Price Reactions to Earnings Surprises: Joint Effects of Abnormal Trading Volume and Institutional Ownership 
 
RET = β0 +β1GOOD +β2ESURP +β3ESURP×GOOD +γ1ESURP×|ESURP| +γ2ESURP×NEGSPEC +γ3ESURP×POSSPEC +γ4ESURP×M/B + γ5ESURP×BETA 
+ γ6ESURP×BOND30 +γ7ESURP×LogSIZE
 
The regression variables are defined in Table 2. We first sort the samples into three groups based on institutional ownership (IO) in each year-quarter. 
Within each institutional ownership group, we further sort the samples into three groups based on abnormal trading volume (ABVOL). Low, Medium, and 
High represent stocks in the bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30% of the distribution, respectively. Within each IO and ABVOL group, we form 
portfolios of the individual stocks by ranking earnings surprise (ESURP) into 20 portfolios. We estimate the regression separately for the low-, medium-, 
and high-ABVOL groups within each IO group, defining RET as the average return and ESURP as the average earnings surprise of all stocks in each 
earnings surprise portfolio. The dummy variable, GOOD, is coded as one if ESURP is positive and coded as zero if negative. Similarly, all of the control 
variables are defined as the average value in each earnings surprise portfolio. To mitigate the influence of extreme values, we truncate M/B and BETA at 
the 1% and 99% level. We truncate NEGSPEC and POSSPEC at the 99% level. The full sample consists of 141,328 quarterly earnings announcements of 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms from 1985 to 2007 with the data necessary to calculate ESURP and RET. Stocks priced below one dollar are excluded. 
Zero earnings surprises and price-deflated absolute earnings surprises greater than 5% are also excluded. Following Petersen (2009), we calculate the t-
statistics using clustered (by time) standard errors to account for the cross-sectional residual dependence within each year-quarter. T statistics are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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    β0 β1 β2 β3 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 Sample Adj.-R2
 
 
            Size (%) 
 Low ABVOL  ***-0.002  ***0.008  0.406  -0.227  -0.614  **-0.215  0.742  **0.268  0.179  0.030  -0.107  1840 10.80 
  (-2.95)  (7.38)  (0.41)  (-0.93)  (-1.00 ) (-2.37)  (0.97 ) (2.30)  (0.64 ) (0.54)  (-0.80 )   
 Med.  ABVOL **-0.002  ***0.016  ***4.872  0.166  **-1.192  -0.064  0.093  -0.219  -0.154  **-0.151  **-0.370  1840 22.49 
High IO  (-1.56 ) (9.48)  (3.60)  (0.65)  (-2.18)  (-0.38) (0.08)  (-0.97)  (-0.43)  (-2.10)  (-2.28)    
 High  ABVOL ***-0.018  ***0.034  ***6.057  0.690  ***-5.342  ***-1.140  0.113  ***0.621  0.268  **-0.220  -0.310  1840 32.42 
  (-8.96)  (10.13)  (2.74)  (0.98)  (-3.49)  (-4.34)  (0.05)  (3.63)  (0.38)  (-2.33)  (-0.76 )   
 High - Low    0.917          
          (1.19)                   
 Low  ABVOL   ***-0.004  ***0.006  ***2.643  -0.173  ***-2.028  ***-0.277  **-1.931  0.088  0.092  -0.040  **-0.217  1840 17.17 
  (-4.19 ) (4.71)  (3.37)  (-0.82 ) (-4.03)  (-2.90)  (-2.31 ) (0.70)  (0.16 ) (-0.56 ) (-2.08 )   
 Med.  ABVOL **-0.002  ***0.013  ***2.957  -0.133  ***-2.689  -0.224  0.717  0.048  -0.475  **-0.112  -0.046  1840 32.08 
Med. IO  (-2.42 ) (11.12)  (3.42)  (-0.59)  (-3.57 ) (-1.47)  (0.44 ) (0.44 ) (-1.50)  (-2.05)  (-0.44)    
 High  ABVOL ***-0.016  ***0.036  2.563  ***1.036  ***-7.246  0.008  -1.110  0.108  -0.711  -0.063  0.275  1840 37.98 
  (-6.45)  (11.24)  (1.52 ) (2.85)  (-5.57)  (0.04)  (-0.68 ) (0.68)  (-1.43)  (-0.55 ) (1.29)    
 High - Low    ***1.208          
          (3.02)                   
 Low  ABVOL   ***-0.007  ***0.007  0.231  ***-0.513  ***-2.391  0.036  -2.129  -0.075  0.131  0.022  0.153  1840 8.42 
  (-6.48)  (4.89)  (0.36)  (-2.86 ) (-3.92)  (0.43)  (-1.52 ) (-1.51)  (0.89)  (0.53)  (1.29)    
Low IO Med.  ABVOL ***-0.004  ***0.013  0.789  -0.166  **-1.927  -0.026  0.595  0.106  -0.315  -0.041  0.121  1840 21.51 
  (-4.40 ) (7.83)  (1.29)  (-0.83)  (-2.56)  (-0.19)  (0.37 ) (1.32)  (-1.09 ) (-0.91)  (1.09)    
 High  ABVOL ***-0.014  ***0.038  **3.131  ***1.243  **-2.913  -0.217  ***-4.487  **0.277  **-0.858  *-0.203  0.010  1840 33.25 
  (-5.44)  (11.22)  (2.33)  (3.50)  (-2.16 ) (-1.03)  (-3.75 ) (2.08)  (-2.12)  (-1.97)  (0.05)    
 High - Low    ***1.756          
          (4.64)                   
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Table 5 
Abnormal Returns around Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
 
This table reports the average abnormal returns (RET) around the quarterly earnings announcements for the portfolios formed using proxies for 
differences of opinion and institutional ownership (IO). RET is the three-day, [-1, 1], return around quarterly earnings announcements adjusted by the 
CRSP value-weighted market return. Panel A shows the mean abnormal returns around the quarterly earnings announcements for the portfolios formed 
using TURN alone, as well as the portfolios formed using both TURN and IO (more specifically, the stocks are first sorted by IO for each year-quarter and 
then within each IO portfolio further sorted into TURN portfolios). Low, Medium, and High represent stocks in the bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 
30% of the distribution, respectively. TURN is the average turnover from trading day -55 to trading day -11 relative to the earnings announcement, the 
proxy used for differences of opinion prior to earnings announcements in Berkman et al. (2009). Panel B performs the same analysis as Panel A, except 
that we use ABVOL, a proxy for differential interpretations of earnings announcements, to replace TURN. Abnormal trading volume (ABVOL) is the 
average turnover over [-1, +1] minus the average turnover over [-55, -11] relative to the earnings announcements. Panel C reports the mean abnormal 
returns around the quarterly earnings announcements for portfolios independently sorted into low, medium, and high groups based on TURN and ABVOL. 
To be consistent with Berkman et al. (2009), we restrict the sample to firm-quarters in the period from 1985 to 2005 with earnings announcement dates 
and stock return information available. We exclude firms in financial industries (SIC Codes 6000 to 6999) and regulated industries (SIC Codes 4900 to 
4999). We further exclude the earnings announcements of firms with $10 million or less in total assets, $10 million or less in the market value of equity, 
and those with a price of less than $1 per share, as reported on COMPUSTAT, at the start of the current fiscal quarter. The final sample consists of 
274,529 firm-quarters. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A:  Dependent Sorts on IO and TURN(-55, -11) 
 Low TURN Med. TURN High TURN High – Low 
 
Ave Obs Per 
Quarter RET 
Ave Obs Per 
Quarter RET 
Ave Obs Per 
Quarter RET RET t-stat 
Full Sample 980 0.57% 1307 0.12% 980 -0.12% ***-0.69% -10.45 
         
High IO 289 0.38% 386 0.35% 289 0.35%       -0.03% -0.37 
Med IO 385 0.52% 515 0.13% 385 -0.24% ***-0.76% -9.06 
Low IO 289 0.92% 386 0.13% 289 -0.86% ***-1.78% -15.81 
 
Panel B:  Dependent Sorts on IO and ABVOL(-1, +1) 
 Low ABVOL Med. ABVOL High ABVOL High – Low 
 
Ave Obs Per 
Quarter RET 
Ave Obs Per 
Quarter RET 
Ave Obs Per 
Quarter RET RET t-stat 
Full Sample 980 -0.67% 1307 0.12% 980 1.12% ***1.78% 15.11 
         
High IO 289  -0.06% 386  0.63% 289  0.44% ***0.50% 3.53 
Med IO 385  -0.61% 515  0.12% 385  0.91% ***1.52% 10.47 
Low IO 289  -1.24% 386  -0.34% 289  1.94% ***3.18% 20.80 
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Panel C:  Independent Sorts on TURN (-55, -11) and ABVOL (-1, +1) 
 Low ABVOL Med. ABVOL High ABVOL High – Low 
 
Ave Obs Per 
Quarter RET 
Ave Obs Per 
Quarter RET 
Ave Obs Per 
Quarter RET RET t-stat 
Full Sample 980 -0.67% 1307 0.12% 980 1.12% ***1.78% 15.11 
         
High TURN 369  -0.76% 171  0.09% 440  0.34% ***1.21% 9.09 
Med TURN 411  -0.65% 499  0.04% 397  1.01% ***1.66% 12.79 
Low TURN 199  -0.52% 637  0.19% 143  3.80% ***5.35% 17.21 
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Table 6 
Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift: Joint Effects of Abnormal Trading Volume and Institutional Ownership 
 
This table reports the mean abnormal returns (RET60) for the decile portfolios formed on the basis of price-scaled earnings surprises (ESURP). RET60 is 
the 60-day return, [+2, +61], around the quarterly earnings announcements adjusted for returns of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms of the same size decile. 
ESURP is the difference between firm reported quarterly earnings per share (EPS) before extraordinary items and the consensus analyst forecast scaled 
by the stock price at the fiscal quarter-end. Consensus analyst forecast is the median analyst forecasts made within 60 days prior to the earnings 
announcement date. Panel A forms earnings surprise portfolios within the subsamples sorted by abnormal trading volume (ABVOL) in each year-quarter. 
Panel B forms earnings surprise portfolios within the subsamples first sorted by institutional ownership (IO) and then by abnormal trading volume 
(ABVOL) in each year-quarter. Abnormal trading volume (ABVOL) is the average turnover over [-1, +1] minus the average turnover over [-55, -11] 
relative to the earnings announcements. Turnover is trading volume divided by shares outstanding, multiplied by 0.5 for NASDAQ stocks. IO is the last 
reported percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors within 180 days prior to the earnings announcements. Low, Medium, and High 
represent stocks in the bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30% of the distribution, respectively. Stocks priced below $1 are excluded. Zero earnings 
surprises and price-deflated absolute earnings surprises greater than 5% are also excluded. The final sample consists of 141,328 quarterly earnings 
announcements of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms from 1985 to 2007 with the data necessary to calculate ESURP and RET. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Sort on Abnormal Trading Volume (ABVOL)  
 Low ABVOL Med. ABVOL High ABVOL 
 D1 D10 Hedge Return Hedge Return D1 D10 Hedge Return Hedge Return D1 D10 Hedge Return Hedge Return 
(D10-D1) (% from long 
position) 
(D10-D1) (% from long 
position) 
(D10-D1) (% from long 
position) 
Full Sample -2.57 0.08 ***2.65 3% -2.05 2.48 ***4.53 55% -0.93 4.98 ***5.91 84% 
             
Panel B:  Sort on Institutional Ownership (IO) and Abnormal Trading Volume (ABVOL)  
 Low ABVOL Med. ABVOL High ABVOL 
 D1 D10 Hedge Return Hedge Return D1 D10 Hedge Return Hedge Return D1 D10 Hedge Return Hedge Return 
(D10-D1) (% from long 
position) 
(D10-D1) (% from long 
position) 
(D10-D1) (% from long 
position) 
High IO -2.05 0.23 ***2.28 10% -0.42 2.33 ***2.75 85% -1.23 2.56 ***3.79 68% 
Med. IO -2.29 0.18 ***2.47 7% -1.00 2.09 ***3.09 68% 0.29 4.16 ***3.87 107% 
Low IO -2.37 0.24 *2.62 9% -3.11 1.51 ***4.61 33% -3.44 6.69 ***10.13 66% 
 
  
